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I. Introduction 
The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution is a powerful grant of 
legislative immunity that protects members of Congress from inquiry into legislative acts and the 
motivations behind those acts.
1
  The original concept of legislative immunity originated over 400 
years ago during struggles over parliamentary power and the creation of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.
2
  The framers of the Constitution, did not adopt the “lex et consuetudo3 of the 
English Parliament as a whole,” but resolutely adopted the Speech or Debate Clause as an 
essential provision for furthering their goals.
4
  Indeed, the motivating purpose behind the Clause 
was to reinforce the deliberately established doctrine of the separation of powers.
5
  By protecting 
the legislature from a potentially hostile judiciary, the founders assured that the legislature would 
remain largely autonomous and free from the potential “tyrannical concentration of all the 
powers of government” that the framers sought to prevent.6  
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators or Representatives] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.”); U.S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (affirming the holding in U.S. v. Johnson, 
383 U.S. 169 (1996), that the Clause protected members from inquiry into legislative acts or motivation for actual 
performance of legislative acts). 
2 U.S. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (“[T]he freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 372 (1951) (discussing the prosecution of a member of Parliament for “seditious” speech in 1688 and the 
events preceding the adoption of the Clause).  
3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th Ed. 2009) (law and custom). 
4 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201 (1880). 
5 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 547; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (James Madison remarked during his discussion concerning the 
Seperation of Powers in government “that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the 
several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration 
of all the powers of government in the same hands.”).  
 2 
Until recently, the Speech or Debate Clause had not been subject to much judicial 
analysis.  In fact the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in over 30 years.
7
  However, two 
recent circuit court decisions, United States v. Renzi and United States v. Rayburn, have brought 
the issue back to the forefront of public debate.
8
  
In United States v. Rayburn,
9
 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Speech or 
Debate Clause provides an absolute bar to the disclosure of written legislative materials.
10
 The 
case resulted from an FBI investigation into charges of corruption and represents the first time in 
history that law enforcement officials conducted a raid on the office of a sitting member of 
Congress.
11
 To reach their holding, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals significantly broadened 
prior Supreme Court precedent and have since drawn fierce criticism from the public, law-
enforcement officials and scholars alike. 
In United States v. Renzi,
12
 the Ninth Circuit considered the scope of legislative privilege 
as applying to what the court describes as “future legislative acts” or negotiations over a future 
piece of legislation. As a condition of supporting land exchange legislation, Congressman Renzi 
demanded that those companies involved include in the draft legislation land owned by an 
associate of the Congressman.
13
  Unbeknownst to them, this associate owed the Congressman a 
substantial amount of money.
14
  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief for the 
Congressman, holding that his actions fall beyond the protections of Speech or Debate.
15
  In 
reaching their conclusion the court relied primarily on Supreme Court precedent in United States 
                                                 
7 See U.S. v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979). 
8
 R. Jeffrey Smith, WASHINGTON POST (June 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-allows-
prosecution-of-ex-ariz-congressman-renzi-on-corruption-charges/2011/06/23/AGZeZ0hH_story.html. 
9 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
10 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 655. 
11Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659. 
12 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
13 Id. at 1017. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 1039. 
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v. Brewster and specifically denounced the broader protection of non-disclosure to the executive 
upheld by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Rayburn.
16
   
Renzi and Rayburn cannot be reconciled as they both incorrectly applied Supreme Court 
precedent to reach what the courts deemed an equitable result.  The D.C. Circuit’s analysis 
disregarded much Supreme Court precedent, and significantly broadened the Clause beyond its 
judicially interpreted bounds.
17
  The Ninth Circuit, wrongly cited Supreme Court precedent for 
propositions that the Court never held, and narrowed the Clause’s protection to cover only those 
acts literally conducted on the House or Senate Floor.
18
  The shortcomings of these circuit court 
cases create an inconsistency in Speech and Debate jurisprudence that requires reconciliation. 
Part II of this note discusses the Constitutional origins of The Speech or Debate Clause, 
and its evolution within Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Part III of this note details the factual 
situations presented in both Renzi and Rayburn as well as each court’s analysis behind their 
decisions.  This part will explain why the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the reasoning of the 
D.C. Circuit.  Part IV analyzes the inherent problems Renzi and Rayburn present including their 
departure from Supreme Court precedent and possible solutions moving forward.  As it stands 
Speech or Debate jurisprudence is vague and unclear. The Supreme Court must guide the lower 
courts with a more certain articulation of the Clause.  This note will conclude by arguing that in 
order to remain true to the Constitutional text, the court should grant more deference to 
Congress’s own disciplinary systems. Rather then forcefully narrowing the clause to envelop 
activities which would be protected by the Clause, if an activity is beyond the Executive’s reach 
                                                 
16 Id. at 1034 (“Simply stated, we cannot agree with our esteemed colleagues on the D.C. Circuit. We disagree with 
both Rayburn's premise and its effect and thus decline to adopt its rationale”). 
17 See discussion infra part III. 
18 See discussion infra part III. 
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then any investigation of its members regarding activities legislative in nature should be 
conducted wholly by Congress.  
II- History of the Speech or Debate Clause and Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The founding fathers adopted the Speech or Debate clause from within the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.
19
  The Clause in the English Bill of Rights codified a parliamentary privilege of 
debate.  It’s codification stifled fear of criminal and civil charges from the monarchy frequently 
used to suppress and intimidate legislators.
20
  In drafting the American Constitution, the 
founders, with similar concerns of executive abuse, “recognized the Clause as an important 
protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature.”21  The drafters of the American 
Constitution recognized the obviousness of the Clause’s inclusion by “approv[ing it] at the 
Constitutional Convention without discussion and without explanation.”22   
United States Courts have recognized the notion of a broad legislative immunity early on.  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, as the first court to construe the Clause and later 
cited favorably by the Supreme Court, suggested Speech or Debate should protect “every thing 
said or done . . . as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of [congressional] office . . . 
whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against 
their rules.”23  
a. The Supreme Court and the Boundaries of the Speech or Debate Clause 
                                                 
19 Compare Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178 (The original text from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 read: “[t]hat the 
Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any 
Court or Place out of Parliament”) and U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“for any Speech or Debate in either House, 
[Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”); 
20 ENID CAMPBELL, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 10 (2003); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. 
21 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. 
22 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177. 
23 Gravel v. U. S., 408 U.S. 606, 660 (1972) (Brennan, J., Dissenting) (citing Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808)). 
 5 
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause in 1880 in Kilbourn v. 
Thompson.
24
  The Court defined a broad privilege, refusing to limit the Clause to words spoken 
in debate, and concluded that the Clause extends at least so far as to “things generally done in a 
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.”25   
The Court did not interpret the Clause again for another 71 years, until Tenney v. 
Brandhove.
26
  The plaintiff, Brandhove brought an action alleging a deprivation of rights under 
the Constitution against Jack Tenney a California State Senator and others, including the Senate 
Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities.
27
 Brandhove had distributed a petition 
among members of the California state legislature urging the Legislature to discontinue 
appropriations for Tenney’s Committee.28 Brandhove’s petition alleged that Tenney’s Committee 
had “used Brandhove as a tool in order ‘to smear Congressman Franck R. Havenner as a ‘Red’ 
when he was a candidate for Mayor of San Francisco in 1947”.29 Following this, the Committee 
asked local prosecutorial officials to institute criminal proceedings against Brandhove and 
summoned him to appear before the Committee for a hearing. Brandhove alleged that the hearing 
was not for a “legislative purpose” and to the contrary was designed to intimidate him, “and 
prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional right[] of free speech…and also to 
deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, due process of law, and of the enjoyment of 
equal privileges and immunities as a citizen….”30 The District Court dismissed Brandhove’s 
claim, while the Ninth Circuit held that the Complaint stated a cause of action against the 
Committee and its members. The Supreme Court granted cert. Reversing the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
24 103 U.S. at 204 (1880). 
25 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (1880) (“It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words 
spoken in debate.”). 
26 341 U.S. 367 (1951).  
27 Id. at 369. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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decision, the Court held that legislators are not liable for allegations which arise from acts within 
the legislative sphere. 
31
  To ensure legislative autonomy from outside pressure, the Court held 
that even “the claim of an unworthy purpose would not destroy the privilege.”32 
In 1966 the Court in United States v. Johnson
33
 interpreted the scope of the Clause’s 
protection in connection with criminal conspiracy charges brought against a Congressman.
34
  As 
part of the general charges against him, the FBI accused Congressman Johnson of receiving 
substantial sums of money in the form of “campaign contributions” to deliver a speech on the 
house floor which was designed to influence the dismissal of pending indictments against a 
savings and loan institution.
35
  The prosecution’s case depended on the admissibility of the 
words included within the speech and testimony regarding the motives behind it. 
36
  The Court 
dismissed the case, holding that regardless of disgracefulness, violations of the Speech or Debate 
Clause include evidence of the substance of a speech on the house floor or any motivation behind 
it.
37
  The court reasoned that “[t]he essence of such a charge…is that the Congressman's conduct 
was improperly motivated, and…that is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause generally 
forecloses from executive and judicial inquiry.”38 
In 1972 the Supreme Court handed down two decisions on the same day, clarifying 
Johnson.  Both cases further attempted to delineate the potentially broad scope of a “legislative 
                                                 
31 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379 (“We conclude only that here the individual defendants and the legislative committee 
were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act.”).  
32 Id. at 378 (“In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative 
conduct and as readily believed.7 Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must 
be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.”). 
33 383 U.S. 169, (1966).  
34 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171 (FBI claimed as part of conspiracy charges that Congressman read a speech favorable to 
independent savings and loan associations in the House). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 177 (The conspiracy theory depended upon a showing that the speech was made solely or primarily to serve 
private interests, and that Johnson in making it was not acting in good faith, that is, that he did not prepare or deliver 
the speech in the way an ordinary Congressman prepares or delivers an ordinary speech). 
37 Id. at 180. 
38 Id. 
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act.”  In United States v. Brewster,39 a United States Senator was indicted for taking a bribe in 
exchange for a promise to deliver a speech on the Senate Floor.
40
  Writing for the court, Chief 
Justice Burger began by reciting the power of a broad Speech or Debate Clause:  “In its 
narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege. It has enabled 
reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the conscious choice 
of the Framers.”41 
Justice Burger acknowledged a necessarily broad reading of the Clause in order for it to 
have force, but refused to extend the Speech or Debate privilege to function as a grant of “super-
immunity.”42  Applying prior precedent, Justice Burger first determined whether the acts in 
question represented a “legislative act.”43  An inquiry into legislative acts or motivations is 
prohibited.  He then presented a two-part framework, first describing a legislative act as:  “An act 
generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it . . . or things ‘said or done by 
him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office.’”44  Secondly Justice 
Burger put forth a number of activities that are political in nature and not considered a legislative 
act:  “a wide range of legitimate ‘errands' performed for constituents [such as,] the making of 
appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing 
so-called ‘news letters' to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the 
Congress.” 45   The Court, in dismissing the Senator’s appeal and distinguishing Johnson, 
reasoned that the Government only needed to show that the Senator accepted a bribe; the 
                                                 
39 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
40 Id. at 502. 
41 Id. at 516. 
42 Id. at 516. 
43 See Johnson 383 U.S. 169. 
44 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512, 513 (citing Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27).  
45 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. 
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government need not prove that he actually fulfilled the illegal bargain, therefore the 
Government did not need to inquire into the protected legislative sphere.
46
  
Decided the same day as Brewster, the Supreme Court in Gravel v. United States
47
 
extended the Speech or Debate Clause to legislative acts done by a Senator’s aides and assistants.  
In Gravel, the FBI subpoenaed a Senator’s aide during an investigation into the alleged release 
and publication of classified documents (The Pentagon Papers) during a subcommittee hearing.
48
 
The Court held that if an act performed by a Congressman personally is privileged then the 
Clause extends to those same undertakings performed by his aides and assistants as well.
49
  In 
reaching their holding, the Court recognized that the “modern legislative process” demands an 
extension of the Clause to further the effective functioning of government.
50
  Extending the 
reasoning of Brewster, the Court provided that the Clause protects “legislative acts” which are 
“an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate 
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection 
of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the 
jurisdiction of either House.”51 Consequently, the court decided the nature of the work done by 
aides and assistants justifies their treatment as “alter-egos” of the Congressmen they represent.  
The Court’s most recent examination of the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
occurred in United States v. Helstoski
52
.  In Helstoski a Congressman was indicted on charges of 
accepting money in return for his influence in the performance of official acts.
53
 Specifically, 
                                                 
46 Id. at 526 (an inquiry into a legislative act or the motivation behind it is not necessary for prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)). 
47 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
48 Gravel, at 608-609.  
49 Id. at 616. 
50 Id. at 617. 
51 Id. at 625. 
52 442 U.S. 477 (1979).  
53 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 479. 
 9 
Congressman Helstoski was charged with receving monies from aliens “for the introduction of 
private bills which would suspend the application of the immigration laws so as to allow them to 
remain in this country.”54 The prosecution had attempted to introduce evidence of past legislative 
acts to prove motive. The Court held that any evidence of references to past legislative acts 
constituted a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause.
55
  Chief Justice Burger reasoned that 
while “the exclusion of evidence of past legislative acts undoubtedly will make prosecutions 
more difficult, nevertheless, the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to preclude prosecution 
of Members for legislative acts.”56  Following their holding in Brewster, the Court affirmed that 
“a promise to deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes is not ‘speech or debate’ within 
the meaning of the Clause, nor is a promise to introduce a bill at some future date a legislative 
act.”57 However, the protection does extend to legislative acts already performed.58 
From Kilbourn to Helstoski the Supreme Court has steadfastly affirmed the purpose of 
the Clause to promote an autonomous legislature free from “executive and judicial oversight that 
realistically threatens to control [their] conduct as a legislat[ure].”59  Yet even with this broad 
purpose in mind the Court has recognized the need to safeguard a balance; recognizing the 
Clause was never meant to “make members of Congress super-citizens immune from criminal 
responsibility.”60  Members of Congress require independence to legislate effectively but it must 
be tempered enough to prevent occurrences of corruption.  
Over time the Supreme Court has limited the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to 
only “legislative activities” but how to define the scope of a “legislative activity” remains 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 487. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 495–96 (the Court reasoned that the Government could have inquired into the motivations for accepting a 
bribe so long as they did not rely upon the motivation in committing an official). 
58 Id. at 490. 
59 See Helstoski 442 U.S. at 492; Gravel, 408 U.S. 606; Johnson, 383 U.S. 169. 
60 Brewster, 408 U.S. 501. 
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unclear.  As one scholar has noted the Court has held what the Clause does not protect:  
“criminal conduct,61  political or representational activities,62  speeches outside of Congress,63 
newsletters,
64
 press releases,
65
 private book publishing,
66
 or the distribution of official committee 
reports outside the legislative sphere”67 (emphasis added).  Accepting that the activities listed 
above would not fall within the protections of the Clause, the standard elicited by the Court 
remains inappropriately broad: “those things ‘generally done in a session of the House by one of 
its members in relation to the business before it,’ or things ‘said or done by him, as a 
representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office.”68  The uncertainty that remains 
demands further clarity from the Court.  
III. Renzi and Rayburn—a spectrum of Speech or Debate Clause protection 
 The scope of the Speech or Debate Clause has never been foreclosed to purely literalistic 
terms. The Clause is “to be read broadly”69  and its purpose is expansive: “to preserve the 
constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of government.”70 “The 
importance of the [Clause] was recognized as early as 1808 in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 
27, where the court said that the purpose of the [Clause] was to secure to every member 
‘exemption from prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the 
                                                 
61 MARCUS A. AUGUSTINE, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515: 
A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House, 35 S.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2008) (citing United States v. Brewster, 408 
U.S. 501, 528–29 (1972)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 MARCUS A. AUGUSTINE, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515: 
A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House, 35 S.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2008) (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
U.S. 111, 113 (1979)). 
66 MARCUS A. AUGUSTINE, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515: 
A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House, 35 S.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2008) (citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625).. 
67 MARCUS A. AUGUSTINE, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515: 
A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House, 35 S.U. L. REV. 515, 523 (2008) (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 313 (1973)). 
68 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512, 513 (quoting Kilbourn, 103 U.S. 168).  
69 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204.  
70 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491.  
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exercise of the functions of that office.’ (Emphasis added.)”71 In the alternative, the Court has 
held that “[t]he immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution 
simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress.”72 The Court has never 
treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process.”73 Based upon this 
tension, the circuit courts have struggled to square two competing results. 
A. United States v. Rayburn 
a. Facts 
On May 18, 2006 the Department of Justice obtained a warrant to search the offices of 
Congressman William Jefferson in the Rayburn House Office Building.
74
  The warrant arose 
from an FBI investigation into a fraud and bribery scheme.  During their investigation the FBI 
spoke with a member of the Congressman’s staff who told them of documents relevant to the 
investigation kept within the confines of the Congressman’s office.75  The FBI concluded they 
had “probable cause to believe that Congressman Jefferson . . . had sought and in some cases 
already accepted financial backing and or concealed payments of cash or equity interests in 
business ventures located in the United States, Nigeria, and Ghana in exchange for his 
undertaking official acts as a Congressman while promoting the business interests of himself and 
[other] targets.”76 
The warrant outlined “special procedures” to identify information which could fall within 
the purview of the Speech or Debate Clause. Among other provisions, the warrant ensured that 
“non case agents” otherwise not affiliated with the investigation would conduct the physical 
                                                 
71 Id.  
72 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507. 
73 Id. at 515.  
74 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
 12 
search.
77
  Furthermore, a “filter team” consisting of two Department of Justice attorneys and one 
FBI agent would review documents obtained to determine whether the Speech or Debate Clause 
applied to them.
78
 On Saturday night, May 20
th, the FBI moved in and “more than a dozen FBI 
agents spent about 18 hours” in the Congressman’s office.  
On May 24, 2006 Congressman Jefferson filed a motion for the return of all materials 
seized; arguing that the Speech or Debate Clause permitted him to review his files to segregate 
legislative materials.
79
 On July 10, 2006 the district court denied the Congressman’s motion 
noting that the warrant “did not impermissibly interfere with Congressman Jefferson's legislative 
activities.”80  The district court rejected the Congressman’s argument that he had a right to 
segregate his files prior to the execution of the search when the warrant was preconditioned to 
obtain only those materials that are outside of the “legitimate legislative sphere.”81 
Congressman Jefferson filed an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals on July 20, 2006 “enjoined the United States, acting through the 
Executive, from resuming its review of the seized materials.”82  The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court to make findings as to which materials 
taken were records of legislative acts.
83
  
On June, 4, 2007 a grand jury returned a sixteen-count indictment against the 
Congressman with a trial scheduled for January 2008.
84
  To prevent prejudice to the 
Congressman by letting the decision stand until after trial, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                 
77 Id.  
78 Reply Brief of Congressman William Jefferson at 1-3, U.S. v. Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (2007) No. 06-3105.  
79 Id.  
80 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 658. 
83 Id.at 658. 
84 Id. 
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agreed to hear an expedited appeal on the constitutionality of the evidence obtained.
85
 The D.C. 
Circuit Court reasoned that “letting the district court's decision stand until after the 
Congressman's trial would, if the Congressman is correct, allow the Executive to review 
privileged material in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause.”86 
b. Court’s Analysis 
On expedited appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court sought to resolve whether the Speech or 
Debate Clause embodies a non-disclosure privilege, specifically whether the contents of 
Congressman Jefferson’s office must necessarily be precluded from disclosure to the executive.87  
Congressman Jefferson asserted that if the Speech or Debate privilege exists it is absolute and he 
must first review the materials, subject to potential judicial review if appropriate.
88
  Jefferson 
argued that the privilege is breached as soon as DOJ officials analyze and read the contents of 
each document and file.
89
  The Congressman believed it absurd to assume that DOJ officials 
could possibly determine which “telephone messages or visits to his office recorded on the 
seized logs” related to legislative activities.90 
Conversely, the DOJ asserted the procedures incorporated by the Government and 
approved by the District Court specifically prevented the review of legislative material by any 
executive official.
91
  They argued that the Government did not seek to punish the Congressman 
for “legislative acts, to question him about such acts, or to use evidence of such acts against 
him.”92 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 Rayburn at 659. 
87 Rayburn at 659. 
88 Reply Brief of Congressman William Jefferson at 7, U.S. v. Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (2007) No. 06-3105. 
89 Reply Brief of Congressman William Jefferson at 10-16, U.S. v. Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (2007) No. 06-3105. 
90Id.  
91 Corrected Brief for the United States at 22 U.S. v. Rayburn, 497 F.3d 654 (2007) No. 06-3105. 
92 Id.  
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Writing for the court, Judge Rogers began with an acknowledgment that although the 
Supreme Court has held that the Clause encompasses a Gravel-like testimonial privilege, to date 
the Court has not yet spoken on whether the Clause includes a non-disclosure privilege.”93 
However, prior precedent within the D.C. Circuit has.
94
 Brown v. Williamson, a civil case, held 
that “documents or other material that comes into the hands of Congressmen may be reached 
either in a direct suit or a subpoena only if the circumstances by which they come can be thought 
to fall outside ‘legislative acts’ or the legitimate legislative sphere.”95  Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
created a non-disclosure privilege extending to all documents and materials within the 
“legislative sphere.”  Citing their decision in Brown96, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “a key 
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to prevent intrusions into the legislative process and 
that the legislative process is disrupted by the disclosure of legislative material, regardless of the 
use to which the disclosed materials are put.”97 Relying primarily on D.C. Circuit precedent and 
a significant broadening of Supreme Court reasoning, Judge Rogers concluded that all legislative 
materials protected by the Speech or Debate Clause must be returned to Congressman 
Jefferson.
98
 
B. United States v. Renzi 
a. Facts 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the scope 
of the legislative privilege as it applies to “future legislative acts” or negotiations over a future 
                                                 
93 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659, 660 
94 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
95 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 62 F.3d at 421. 
96 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 62 F.3d 408) (stating that the purpose of 
the Speech or Debate Clause is to “‘insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be 
performed independently,’ without regard to the distractions of private civil litigation or the periods of criminal 
prosecution.”) (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975)).   
97 Rayburn, 497 F.3d  at 660. 
98 Rayburn, 497 F.3d  at 666. 
 15 
piece of legislation.
99
  In November 2002, Arizona voters elected Congressman Renzi to the 
United States House of Representatives and shortly thereafter he obtained a seat on the House 
Natural Resources Committee (“NRC”) of which counts among its many responsibilities, the 
approval of land exchange legislation before it can reach the floor of the house.
100
  
In 2004 and 2005, Resolution Copper Mining (“RCC”) hired a consulting firm to obtain 
surface rights from the US government to a copper field on which they already owned mineral.
101
  
The Consulting firm, Western Land Group, “approached Renzi about developing and sponsoring 
the necessary land exchange legislation.”102  According to the allegations, Congressman Renzi 
“met with RCC representatives in his congressional office in February 2005 and instructed them 
to purchase property owned by James Sandlin if RCC desired Renzi’s support.103  Renzi failed to 
disclose that Sandlin was a former business partner owing over $700,000 to the Congressman.
104
  
Negotiations with Sandlin fell through and RCC informed Renzi they would not acquire the 
Sandlin property to which Renzi replied, “[N]o Sandlin property, no bill.”105 
Renzi then met with another buyer, an investment group led by Philip Aries, assuring 
Aries that if he “purchased and included [the Sandlin property] . . . the legislation would receive 
a ‘free pass’ through the NRC.106  One week later, Aries agreed, purchased the property for $4.6 
million and wired a $1 million deposit to Sandlin.
107
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Following the receipt of the $1 million deposit, “Sandlin wrote a $200,000 check payable 
to Renzi Vino, Inc., an Arizona company owned by Renzi.
108
  Renzi deposited the check into a 
bank account of Patriot Insurance—an insurance company he also owned—and used 
$164,590.68 to pay an outstanding Patriot Insurance debt.”109  Before closing on the property, 
Aries asked for assurance Renzi would follow through with the deal, to which Renzi personally 
assured him that once the sale was complete he would introduce the land exchange proposal.
110
  
The day Aries completed the sale of the property, “Sandlin paid the remaining $533,000 owed 
into a Patriot Insurance account.”111  Renzi never completed his side of the bargain, failing to 
introduce “any land exchange bill involving Aries and the Sandlin property.”112 After these 
events an FBI investigation ensued, eventually resulting in two separate grand jury indictments 
against Renzi.
113
 
b. Court’s Analysis 
The Court began its analysis with a consideration of whether Renzi’s “negotiations” with 
RCC and Aries constitute protected “legislative acts.”114  If Renzi’s negotiations are “legislative 
acts” then he obtains the benefit of 3 protections: (1) the Government could not prosecute 
Renzi,
115
 regardless of motivation;
116
 (2) the Government could not compel Renzi or his aides to 
testify at trial or grand jury proceedings concerning those acts;
117
 (3) nor introduce evidence of 
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those acts to any jury.
118
  If the “negotiations” are not “legislative acts” then the Clause’s 
protections do not apply.  
To determine whether Renzi’s conduct falls within the reach of the clause, the Ninth 
Circuit first engaged in a review of Supreme Court precedent.  Conceding that when the Clause 
applies it does so absolutely, the court opined that delineating the limits of the Clause requires 
delicate deliberation.
119
  The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Clause “should be read broadly to 
effectuate its purposes”120 and prior cases “have included within its reach anything ‘generally 
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.’”121 
Although broad, the court went on to acknowledge the limits imposed by prior Supreme Court 
precedent.  Neither activities political in nature
122
 nor promises to perform future legislative acts 
are afforded protection by the Clause.
123
 With this framework, the court rejected Congressman 
Renzi’s assertion that negotiations “over future legislation [is] analogous to discourse between 
legislators over the content of a bill and must be considered a protected legislative act.”124 
After affirming the district court’s decision to deny Congressman Renzi’s public 
corruption charges, the court addressed whether the district court erred in “declining to dismiss 
the indictment in its entirety for, as Renzi alleges, the pervasive presentment of ‘legislative act’ 
evidence to the grand jury.”125  The Ninth Circuit agreed that they “cannot permit an indictment 
that depends on privileged material to stand—and burden a member with litigation that 
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ultimately cannot succeed—or else the Clause loses much of its teeth.”126  However, the “mere 
fact that some ‘legislative act evidence’ was presented to the grand jury cannot entitle Renzi to 
dismissal.”127  To reconcile this, the court adopted the Swindall standard from the Eleventh 
Circuit; the standard mandates that an indictment should not be dismissed unless the evidence 
presented to the jury caused the jury to indict.
128
  Applying the Swindall standard to Renzi, the 
court held that “the indictment against Renzi does not depend on ‘legislative act’ evidence, 
[thus]…dismissal is not warranted.”129 
Lastly, the court addressed Renzi’s claim that the district court erred in failing to hold a 
“Kastigar-like hearing130 to determine whether the Government used evidence protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause to obtain non-privileged evidence and whether the Government can 
prove its case with evidence derived from legitimate independent sources.” 131   The court 
explained that if they granted Renzi’s proposal, it would act as an affirmance of the non-
disclosure privilege elicited by the court in Rayburn.  The Ninth Circuit refused to accept that 
“legislative convenience precludes the Government from reviewing documentary evidence 
referencing ‘legislative acts’ even as part of an investigation into unprotected activity.” 132  
Refusing to accept such a broad interpretation of the Clause, the Ninth Circuit then went on to 
assert their reasons for disagreement with both the premise and effect of Rayburn.  
                                                 
126 Renzi, 497 F.3d at 1028 (citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)). 
127 Id. at 1029. 
128 Id. (citing United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir.1992)). 
129 Renzi, 497 F.3d at 1026. 
130 See SUSAN R. KLEIN & KATHERINE P. CHIARELLO, Successive Prosecutions and Compound Criminal Statutes: A 
Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 398 (1998) (“In Kastigar v. United States the Court held that a person may be 
required, consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, to testify under a grant of use 
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legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.’”). 
131 Renzi, 497 F.3d at 1032. 
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s holding that distraction of Members 
from legislative tasks “could serve as the touchstone of the Clause’s testimonial privilege.”133  
Instead they asserted that distraction is only sufficient to foreclose inquiry when the underlying 
action is precluded first.
134
  The court further supported their position that the Clause does not 
incorporate a non-disclosure privilege by the fact that the Supreme Court has reviewed 
“legislative act” evidence on countless occasions and if the Clause applies, it does so 
absolutely.
135
  A distinction in which the Executive is barred from reviewing evidence that the 
judiciary has already reviewed cannot exist.
136
  Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
“narrowly drawn limits” imposed by the Supreme Court foreclose an extension of the Speech or 
Debate Clause to the Congressman Renzi.  
IV. Reconciliation 
The Speech or Debate Clause is a “very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege.  It has 
enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the 
conscious choice of the Framers.”137  
While the Supreme Court has imposed limits on the broad power of the Speech or Debate 
Clause, many questions remain; including whether the Clause encompasses a broad privilege of 
non-disclosure and how to define  “those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate 
in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts.”138  While the D.C. 
Circuits’ qualified nondisclosure privilege is too broad the Ninth Circuit’s limited definition of a 
legislative act is much too narrow.
139
  Further unsettling, is the Ninth Circuit’s skewed 
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justifications for refusing to extend the Speech or Debate Clause to Congressman Renzi’s 
“negotiations.”  Even attempts to reach the “right” result cannot come at the cost of a 
dismantling of precedent, presumably leaving protected only those words actually spoken on the 
House and Senate Floor.  
A. Renzi is distinguishable from United States v. Brewster 
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching their holding, found the facts of  Brewster analogous to the 
scenario before it.
140
  In Brewster the Supreme Court refused to extend the protections of the 
Clause to negotiating with individuals and ultimately promising future legislative acts (a 
favorable speech on the house floor) in exchange for a bribe.
141
  The Ninth Circuit held that 
similar to Brewster, Congressman Renzi’s “negotiations” are not protected “legislative acts.” 142  
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed.  Congressman Brewster was charged 
under, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) 
provides “that a Member who ‘corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, 
or agrees to receive anything of value . . . in return for . . . (1) being influenced in his 
performance of any official act’ is guilty of an offense.”143  In Brewster the illegal conduct is 
“taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way.144 There is no need for 
the Government to show that appellee fulfilled the alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the 
bribe is the violation of the statute, not performance of the illegal promise.”145 The Brewster 
prosecution had to prove that Congressman Brewster accepted a bribe and was aware of the 
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bribe-giver’s corrupt intent. 146   In Brewster, to prove an alleged bribery charge the 
Congressman’s motive in connection with the legislative act was of no consequence to the 
prosecution.
147
 
Contrarily, Congressman Renzi’s motives regarding the land-exchange legislation are 
essential in order for the Prosecution to prevail. Unlike Brewster, Congressman Renzi did not 
simply take a bribe. The Renzi indictment alleges that Congressman Renzi  “insisted that the 
Sandlin Property must be included in the land exchange proposal if he was to be a sponsor.”148 It 
is not illegal for Congressmen to insist on the inclusion of properties in land exchange proposals 
unless that insistence is motivated by private gain. The indictment was sustained because the 
court believed Renzi’s insistence that the land exchange legislation include the Sandlin property 
was the result of an improper motive.
149
 Consequently, the Renzi indictment requires an inquiry 
into Congressman Renzi’s legislative acts and his motives behind them. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has held the Speech or Debate Clause precludes any inquiry into the motives behind the 
crafting of legislation.
150
  
The Renzi court’s desire to achieve the “just” result, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
cannot protect Congressman Renzi, must not come at the expense of Constitutional 
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jurisprudence. Although, “the exclusion of evidence of past legislative acts undoubtedly will 
make prosecutions more difficult, . . . the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to preclude 
prosecution of Members for legislative acts.” 151  Any admitted reference to the legislative acts of 
a Member undermines the values protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
B. Congressman Renzi engaged in protected “legislative acts” 
The Ninth Circuit refused to characterize Congressman Renzi’s “negotiations” over land-
exchange legislation as “legislative acts.”  Instead, they construed the negotiations as equivalent 
to promises to perform future acts, which the Court has held fall outside the protections of the 
Clause.
152
  The Ninth Circuit’s characterization however, is unsound. 
The drafting of land-exchange legislation involves extensive negotiations between 
Members of Congress and private landowners, necessarily private individuals become involved 
in a large part of the process.
153
  Members who seek to pass land-exchange legislation must reach 
a consensus with their fellow committee members as well as the landowners involved.
154
  Thus, a 
land exchange proposal is analogous to the drafting of legislation. 
The Supreme Court has extended the protections of the Clause to “[c]ommittee reports, 
resolutions, and the act of voting,”155 committee investigations and hearings,156 and information 
gathering in furtherance of legislative activities.” 157  Accordingly, Congressman Renzi’s 
negotiations with landowners regarding potential land-exchange legislation are protected as well 
because they at least represent “information gathering in furtherance of legislative activities.”  If 
the Clause does not even protect negotiations over the terms of potential legislation because 
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those negotiations relate only to “future legislative acts” then it appears the only protection left is 
for the literal words spoken on the House and Senate floor.
158
 A restriction so narrow undermines 
the purposes of the Clause and renders its existence null.  
C. The Privilege of Non-Disclosure and Speech or Debate 
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Rayburn premised their holding on the contention 
that, because one of the primary purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause is to prevent 
interference with the legislative process, then necessarily any form of executive mandated 
disclosure is barred. The court specifically relied on prior circuit precedent
159
 and a singular 
statement made by the Supreme Court in Gravel that “[t]he Speech or Debate Clause was 
designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and 
deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.” 160   However, the 
Supreme Court never intended the protections of the Clause to reach so far.
161
  
The Rayburn ruling creates two serious implications for Speech and Debate Clause 
jurisprudence:  “first, it denies the FBI and DOJ agents the ability to execute search warrants on 
congressional offices for non-privileged documents without first obtaining the consent of the 
member of Congress under investigation; and second, it allows the lawmaker to unilaterally 
decide which documents are protected by the Clause.”162  As predicted, in the wake of the 
Rayburn decision, law-enforcement officials have had a much more difficult time bringing 
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public corruption charges against public officials.
163
 But any further narrowing of the scope of 
the Clause comes at the expense of its purpose. At least one scholar has argued that the Rayburn 
court could have relied on general separation of powers principles alone to justify their 
decision.
164
  Regardless of any protections in place, legislative materials must have necessarily 
been disclosed to both the FBI and therefore the executive, which creates a conflict.
165
 For 
example, there is an obvious conflict in the FBI seizure of documents that may include materials 
pertaining to legislation in opposition to the party in which the executive belongs.
166
  This fact 
alone justifies ensuring the protections of Speech or Debate remain in place. 
The Speech or Debate Clause provides an absolute privilege of non-disclosure. While a 
more flexible and nuanced privilege of non-disclosure in Rayburn sufficiently balances 
legislative interests, this approach remains inconsistent with constitutional text and existing 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Due to the absolute nature of the Speech or Debate privilege it is 
difficult to reconcile Rayburn’s holding in which the judiciary may be able to review documents 
that they are forbidden from reviewing in the first place.  
D. Congressional Discipline 
In rejecting the reasoning from Rayburn, that distraction alone can justify asserting the 
privilege of Speech or Debate,
167
 the Renzi court correctly points out Congressional Members 
have many times been “distracted by investigations and litigation…in cases in which the 
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underlying action was not precluded by the Clause.” 168  Clearly, interference with the 
legislative process cannot stand alone in justifying the invocation of the Clause. However, 
the prevention of intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary can, and should.
169
As political parties in America express an ever-increasing 
disdain for one another it is not difficult to imagine a situation where the executive branch of 
one party launches an attack on the Congressional members of the other. Because of this, it is 
this author’s opinion, that despite the court’s inclination to hold Congressman Renzi’s 
negotiations as “non-legislative” in nature they should have been held for what they are; 
“act[s] resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office… [or] thing[s] said or 
done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of [his] office.”170 This 
ruling would be wholly consistent with the Court’s broad articulation of the Clause. Instead 
of the Executive or Judicial Branch bringing charges against Congressman Renzi, Congress’s 
internal disciplinary system and ultimately the voters should have handled the issue. While 
this seems drastic, the greater consequence of executive bullying against disfavored 
legislators will be avoided and the Clause can remain true to the Constitutional text.  
Granting greater power to Congress’ internal disciplinary system would work in 
Congressman Jefferson’s case as well. The Rayburn court reaches the peculiar result that 
Congressman Jefferson should have first been able to decide for himself which documents 
were “legislative in nature.” Rather than this process even occurring, the FBI could have 
contacted a member of the Congressional disciplinary committee to assist them with their 
search and mark the those files deemed to be legislative in nature. This solution would 
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reconcile the problem of  allowing “neutral” members of the executive or the judicial 
branches to review files they should be precluded from seeing in the first place. If the FBI 
still has enough evidence for an indictment, which does not involve any actions or materials 
“legislative in nature”, they may then proceed. However, should the FBI lack sufficient 
evidence yet there remains the possibility of an offense based on those materials, then the 
investigation should be left to the disciplinary committees within Congress to conduct on 
their own.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide guidance to the lower courts on 
the correct way to apply the Speech or Debate Clause. Guided by the Court, lower courts have 
tended to apply the Clause as a linguistic formula; asking whether an activity is “within the 
legislative sphere.” Unfortunately, the Court has not provided much guidance on how one makes 
that determination. A determination of what should be included within that “sphere” will depend 
on the purpose of the Clause. If the purpose of the Clause is to prevent executive retaliation 
against disfavored legislators then at least Congressmen Renzi’s conduct should be protected.  If 
the purpose is to prevent interference with the legislative process then the broad non-disclosure 
privilege upheld in Rayburn should be upheld. If the purpose is neither of the above, then there 
really is no purpose for the Clause at all.  
 
